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SQUADRON STORIES
Read the detailed story of Cdr Pappas and his shootdown over the skies of Vietnam.
A follow up to Dave Lesser story about Lt. (Bent Wings) Williams. First of all I was there and the story is true. After the incident, Steve McQuery, Airman working in the AK shop was ordering parts so Airframes could fix the plane. He needed to order a small part for the wing, but could not find the correct part number, so instead he used the part number for the entire wing. A couple of weeks later a semi tractor trailer pulled up in front of the hangar with a complete wing assembly. Who said our supply system didn't work....John Pfannenstiel.
Still in the Indian Ocean. The hostage rescue mission had just ended and ended tragically for some of the rescue force. Keep in mind that there were two carrier task forces on station for this operation, us and the Nimitz. Of course the Nimitz was the show boat of the fleet so all the brass and media were on board her. No one wanted the old girl, the Coral Sea, to host all the hot shots. So there we were, mad as hell that our mission failed. All of a sudden a steady parade of S-3 Viking COD's start coming aboard. We also get an UNREP in the middle of all this. Well low and behold, pallets of beer are starting to pile up on the deck right next to the island. Woo Hoo! This must be our reward for flying non-stop for months and our part in the rescue mission, right? Wrong! That beer sat right there with someone assigned to watch it, probably a MARDET grunt. The next day, right under our noses, helicopters from the Nimitz start picking up the suds and flying it over to their ship. The party was on for the Nimitz boys and all the brass over there. We didn't get a drop! I actually worked with a guy that was on the Nimitz back then and he remembered the beer party and the fact that they were all laughing about how pissed the Coral Sea guys must have been. He of course agreed that he owed me a few beers. Still in the Indian Ocean. We are being relieved by the Constellation. As a part of the day the Connie put on an air show for us. Right at the end of the show their squadrons formed up for an airwing flyover. Before they made their approach another plane appeared off the port stern. It was a Russian bear being escorted right by us. Just about that time the airwing came up right behind the bear and just a little above him. The airwing overtook the bear and as soon as they did the bear put it to the fire wall and bugged out. That russian pilot must of dropped a load.
Liberty in Olangapo City. In 79/80 there was midnight curfew. The base would blow a ten minute warning horn and then another at the stroke of midnight. Many a night when the midnight horn blew and we were still out on the town. You know how hard it is to get a sailor off a bar stool! It was like a rodeo, the Shore Patrol jeeps would come flying up main street to try and nab sailors. It was funny as hell. Sort of like turning on the lights in the kitchen at midnight and watching the cockroaches scatter. We would run like hell and dive into the nearest hotel for the night. Once I got chased right up the steps of a hotel with two SP's hot on my heels. The old man behind the desk waved me through a doorway and closed it behind me. The SP's were yelling at this guy but he played dumb. Close one. Some Ocean. It's the middle of the day and a launch cycle just completed. An A-7E Corsair II is being brought up on the forward starboard elevator. A plane captain is in the cockpit riding the brakes. The pilot and a couple of us squadron guys are waiting at the elevator because that's where it's going to be spotted for the next launch. The elevator starts up and I hear the pilot say something about the "headknocker". Sure enough, the head knocker is up, which means the ejection seat is armed and dangerous! I guess the plane captain didn't like it poking into his head so he moved it up. The plane arrived on the roof. The safety cable lowered. And the pilot took about two steps and jumped up to the cockpit. Before he strangled the plane captain he lowered the head knocker. He proceeded to scream at this kid about ejection seats and being stupid and caused a big scene. Never saw a pilot lose it like that. Here's one that I actually fell for. Keep in mind that you could actually bring visitors aboard at certain times while the ship was in port(note my pitiful disclaimer). We had just pulled away from Cubi and were heading back out to sea. We were in the AE shop when some of our AM guys stopped by. They were all excited. "Did you guys hear? They found a stowaway below decks. One of the snipes had her hiding down there for days." "Really?" I said. "Yeah, there going to helo her back to the base as soon as the deck is ready. Let's go topside and see if we can get a look at her." "OK" I said. And with that we hauled butt up to the roof to see the festivities. Of course when we got up on the flight deck there was nothing going on. Except about six guys laughing their asses off at me! VA-27 Corsair II coming in for a landing. He caught the wire and started traveling up the deck. Then "snap", the tail hook broke off. He of course was at full throttle and just barely had enough speed to lift off again. He dumped fuel and came around for a perfect landing into the barricade. VA-27 Corsair II returning from a sortie. He flew over the carrier broke left and deployed his speed brake. He put his gear down and got in the pattern for a landing. That's when he noticed that his speed brake would not come back up. On the A7-E the speed brake extends well below the landing gear. He circled the ship and dumped fuel. It was decided to try a barricade landing. This was very risky because if he put it down even a little bit off it could roll and crash. I remember being on the hose team just forward of the island. I thought, "great, this is about where the fireball and wreckage will come to a stop". He lined up and drove it right down the center line. As soon as he got over the round down he cut power and set it down hard. The speed brake touched first but the pilot held it level. He just kept going into the barricade and grinding down the speed brake until the wheels hit. He came to a stop right in front of our hose team and hot footed it out of the cockpit. Other than the huge trail of sparks, the landing was perfect.
After serving on three different aircraft carriers and working the night shift for the majority of my four-and-a-half years in the Navy, I was no stranger to operating around the flight deck at night. While on deployment near the Great Barrier Reef of Australia, I had no real concern about volunteering to participate in a night flight-deck scrub-down (SCRUBEX). I grabbed my float coat and cranial and headed to the island for muster with the FOD team. However, before going to the flight deck, my supervisor stopped me and made sure I did a full inspection of both my float coat and my cranial. I then put on my personal protective equipment (PPE) and went to the SCRUBEX. Once on the flight deck, I noticed it was an especially dark night. A thick layer of clouds obscured the moon and stars. After muster, everyone lined up along the forward edge of the landing area on the port side of the ship. As I moved along the line of people to take my position on the far port side, I was looking toward the stern, not really paying attention to where I was going. I reached the end of the line and took an extra step toward what I thought was a few more feet of flight deck. However, I suddenly realized nothing was beneath my feet but night air. Confusion gave way to concern as I tumbled through the air. I just had stepped off the edge of the ship and was falling into the sea. I yelled all the way down and kept yelling as I smacked the water on my left side. I instantly was submerged, but, just as quickly, I was forced back above water when my float coat inflated automatically. With my head above water, I was able to spit out some of the saltwater in my mouth and took a deep breath. I needed the air to continue yelling and waving my arms at a group of Sailors on the smoking sponson. Unfortunately, no one heard me over the sounds of the ship, and I only could watch as the carrier passed by. I then located my strobe light, took it out, and activated it. I was thankful it worked, but I wasn’t sure how effective it would be because I’d already lost sight of the ship due to the rough seas that night. Being alone in the dark and floating on rough seas is a scary and lonely experience. The only light I could see anywhere was the flashing of my own emergency strobe. I hoped that someone would spot me and that I would be rescued quickly. It seemed like an eternity had passed before I noticed the lights of a rigid hull inflatable boat (RHIB) sent to rescue me. As soon as I saw the lights and recognized the boat, I yelled and waved my arms. Once the RHIB was close to me, a rescue swimmer jumped into the water, and, before I knew it, I was aboard the RHIB and headed back to the ship. Once aboard, I was taken to medical, where my CO and the rest of my chain of command were waiting to make sure I was OK. A full medical exam and several sets of X-rays showed no serious injuries. I was lucky to walk away with only some pain in my left leg and hip and a bruised ego. I felt like an idiot for having done something as careless and stupid as walking off the edge of the ship. Looking back on the incident, I am very grateful my supervisor made me thoroughly inspect my PPE before heading to the flight deck. I am also happy I’d been trained to react to the situation by activating my strobe light. Later that night, I learned an airman from my squadron on the SCRUBEX detail was the only person who saw me fall overboard. He immediately went to flight-deck control and reported a man overboard. The only thing that gave away my position in the pitch-black night was my strobe light. I’m sure glad it worked. Complacency creates a dangerous environment. All of the safety procedures—gear inspections, supervisory oversight, PPE training, and flight-deck situational awareness—are not things that should be taken lightly. My rescue at sea is proof of their importance.
There was a late lineup change that resulted in CAG and me swapping jets with the other section. My new jet was aircraft 215. The same jet that I lost brakes in just a week prior on another night flight. I quickly dismissed the thought and signed for the jet, which had already flown earlier that day without any problems, and proceeded to the PR shop to don my flight gear. The PRs had all of my gear ready to go for my flight, to include a pair of night-vision goggles (NVGs). Knowing that I hadn't completed my squadron's NVG syllabus, I reluctantly had to hand them back. The other guys in the PR shop light-heartedly gave me a hard time for having to go out into the night “blind.” Lucky for me, it was a clear evening, with only a scattered cloud layer at two thousand feet. After a normal pre-flight, with no discrepancies noted, I climbed the ladder and strapped in, just as the sun was going down. The startup, taxi and takeoff were normal. We headed to the working area, about 100 miles south of the airfield. It was a little hazy at our cruising altitude, which made it challenging to maintain sight of each other, so CAG contacted the E-2 to request a higher altitude. We received clearance to climb to 17,500 feet MSL for the transit. As we were passing through 17,000 feet, I heard a loud bang, which felt like it was under the right side of the jet. About the same time, I received a Master Caution light accompanied by an “Engine Right, Engine Right.” aural caution. Out of the corner of my eye I caught a glimpse of a R STALL caution that quickly disappeared from the Digital Data Indicator, or DDI. I pulled the right throttle back, and checked the engine page as I was discussing the indications with CAG. All of the parameters on the right motor were normal. As I began to think everything was okay, I heard “Engine Left, Engine Left” in my headset. I immediately looked down to see an L ENG caution on my DDI. “What now?” I thought. I retarded the left throttle to idle, brought up my engine page and saw a big red >>THRUST<< staring back at me. I informed my flight lead about the new development and we both agreed it was time to RTB. We started a shallow descending left turn down to 8000 feet and put Atsugi on the nose. After about 135 degrees of turn, I realized that I was starting to flush out in front of my lead, so I pulled the right throttle to idle to fix my acuteness. At that time, I got yet another Master Caution, alerting my attention to an L FLAMEOUT. At this point, I thought, “What else could go wrong?” I watched the RPM decay, as I struggled to keep my lead in sight. I came back inside and looked at my Engine Fuel Display, EFD, and saw the RPM stable around 50%. It didn't match up with the right engine, but it hadn't spooled down to zero RPM either. The L FLAMEOUT caution remained. I leveled off at 8000 feet, and CAG gave me the lead for the RTB. He called back to base to have them review NATOPS and to back us up on all of the procedures. I advanced the left throttle to see if the engine would respond, but the RPM didn't increase. I told my flight lead that I still had 50% RPM and the engine wasn't responding. He then told me to go ahead and secure the left motor, which I did. Immediately I lost all power in the cockpit as the left engine spooled down and the generator kicked offline. My first thought was, i s my other generator on? After what seemed like an eternity, the displays all came back to life as the right generator picked up the load. The left engine spooled down to 0%, 300°C, and 104% on the nozzle. I had never seen a nozzle that far open before, but then again, I've never had to shut down an engine in-flight before either. Up until this point, I hadn't been overly concerned. I had one working engine and a wingman with over 3000 Hornet hours. But with a 50-mile transit, at 250 kts, it was going to take a while. I had one engine, which had given me a stall indication earlier. Not more than two minutes later, my other engine had flamed out. A variety of scenarios began running through my head. If my right engine decided to fail me, where was I going to end up? I was fifty miles from base, at night, and over water that looked really cold. We covered all of the specifics of a single engine landing, and contingencies for the approach. Lucky for me, the right engine was still operating, so I could lower the gear normally and wouldn't have to take a trap, which is a concern for an airwing operating at a single runway airfield. I dumped down to 5,500 lbs to lower my landing speed, and continued on for a PAR to runway 19. I was ready for the turn to final to get this interesting night over with. I continued on with the approach at 150 kts, slightly faster than on-speed to help with controllability. As I got closer to the field, I started to slow to on-speed. As I approached my on-speed airspeed of 131 kts, I heard “Flight Controls, Flight Controls.” Uh-oh , was all I thought. I checked the FCS page, and saw a 4-channel AOA failure. Sure enough, I had no information in the HUD regarding AOA. I thought, No problem, I'll just look at the indexer. But to my surprise, that wasn't giving me any information either. So, I mashed the FCS reset button, which cleared the fault, returning all of my AOA values. However, moments later, the four-channel AOA failure returned. After two more iterations of FCS cautions and failed resets, I realized that the jet didn't want to provide me with any AOA information for my approach. So I resorted to fly the rest of the approach fast, eventually slowing to 131 kts just prior touchdown. After my uneventful, single-engine, no AOA approach and landing, I cleared the duty, and taxied back to my line where a group of maintainers eagerly awaited my return. As it turns out, the night's events were the due to unrelated emergencies. The left engine flameout was the result of a failed Variable Exhaust Nozzle (VEN) pump. When the pump failed, it drove the VEN to a full open position. The outcome was a loss of backpressure to the engine, and when the throttle was moved to idle, it caused the engine to flameout. The flameout logic then tried to restart the engine, but was unable because of the failed VEN. The only way to deal with it, at the time, was to shut it down to prevent any further damage to the engine. As for the 4-channel AOA failure, delamination of the heating element in one of the AOA probes is the suspected source of the problem. The damaged probe stuck at one AOA value, while the undamaged probe continued to move freely. Once a large enough split developed, the FCS declared the AOA input invalid and generated the four-channel failure. Bottom-line, during flights that experience multiple emergencies, aircrew coordination between cockpits is paramount. Effective and concise communication helped identify, implement, and execute a plan to expeditiously land this aircraft in a safe manner. Scenarios like these are precisely why we practice ACT in naval aviation. |
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Contact me, Bob Dorais, at: bob@miyf27.com
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